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INTRODUCTION 
Enacted on March 23, 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (“ACA”) promised sweeping reforms to address the 
dramatic rise in American health care costs that continued unchecked 
throughout the previous decade.1  These rising costs stemmed from 
factors including increasing prices for drugs, medical equipment, and 
hospital services.2  Spending for Medicaid, the joint federal and state 
program that covers uninsured, low-income Americans, rose 5.3% 
annually between 2001 and 2010.3  New York traditionally spends 
more money on Medicaid than any other State.4  For example, in 
2005, New York5 spent roughly forty-five billion dollars—fifteen 
percent of the total spent nationally on Medicaid.6  To control social 
health care spending, the ACA promotes the formation of 
Accountable Care Organizations (“ACOs”), or groups of health care 
providers that collaborate by pooling resources, information, and 
services to generate efficiencies in care delivery while simultaneously 
lowering costs.7  New York followed suit in 2014, initiating its 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Mike Patton, U.S. Health Care Costs Rise Faster than Inflation, FORBES 
(June 29, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2015/06/29/u-s-health-care-
costs-rise-faster-than-inflation/#2dbe7dd06ad2 [https://perma.cc/RCA7-YJ26]. 
 2. See id. 
 3. See THOMAS P. DINAPOLI, N.Y. STATE COMPTROLLER, MEDICAID IN NEW 
YORK: THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE TO IMPROVE CARE AND CONTROL 
COSTS   6   (2015), https://www.osc.state.ny.us/reports/health/medicaid_2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K9KP-66RB]. 
 4. CITIZEN BUDGETS COMM’N, MEDICAID IN NEW YORK: WHY NEW YORK’S 
PROGRAM IS THE MOST EXPENSIVE IN THE NATION AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 2–3 
(2006), http://www.cbcny.org/sites/default/files/reportsummary_medicaid_04202006.
pdf [https://perma.cc/5GDB-2VHJ]. 
 5. Medicaid is an entitlement program that provides health care for low income 
individuals in the United States. See Andy Schneider & Victoria Wachino, Chapter 
IV: Medicaid Administration, in THE MEDICAID RESOURCE BOOK, 129, 131–33 
(2003).  The program is jointly operated by the federal and state governments.  
Though state participation in Medicaid is optional, every state has opted to 
participate. Id.  Under Medicaid, states administer programs to provide health care 
on a day-to-day basis pursuant to a set of federal guidelines and under the 
supervision of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services at the Department of 
Health and Human Services. Id.  The federal government provides funds that match 
state expenditures associated with the costs of providing health services and 
administering the program. Id. 
 6. See CITIZEN BUDGETS COMM’N, supra note 4, at 3. 
 7. See Cory H. Howard, The Federal Trade Commission and Federal Courts’ 
Scrutiny of Healthcare Mergers: Do Inflexible Standards and Increased Scrutiny 
Stifle the Legislative Intent of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act?, 
18 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 67, 84 (2015). 
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Delivery System Reform Incentive Payment (“DSRIP”) Program, 
which, through an agreement with the U.S. Center for Medicaid and 
Medicare Services, reinvests approximately eight billion dollars to 
promote the creation of Performing Provider Systems.8  A 
Performing Provider System (“PPO”) is a form of ACO meant to 
improve the quality of care and reduce the costs attributable to 
Medicaid.9  
However, increased collaboration among competing health care 
providers can create antitrust problems, as a PPS is a state-created 
cartel.10  Collaborations or combinations among rivals may reduce the 
number of competitors in the market and result in increased prices 
and reduced alternatives from which consumers may choose.11  To 
protect its health care reform efforts from antitrust enforcement, the 
New York State Government has given each PPS the option to apply 
for a Certificate of Public Advantage (“COPA”).  A COPA is a 
statutory mechanism that purports to provide certain collaborations 
with immunity from private or government actions under the federal 
antitrust laws by invoking the state action doctrine.12  The Supreme 
Court established the state action doctrine, which protects states’ 
ability to regulate their markets and displace competition in a manner 
inconsistent with the antitrust laws.13  A private entity may raise state 
action immunity as a defense to an antitrust claim if (1) it engaged in 
anticompetitive conduct pursuant to a “clearly articulated and 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See David Evans, New York State Health Care—DSRIP, PPSs, COPAs, and 
Antitrust “Immunity,” KELLEY DRYE CLIENT ADVISORIES: PUBLICATIONS & BLOGS 
(Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.kelleydrye.com/publications/client_advisories/1004 
[https://perma.cc/R2W6-ALY4]. 
 9. See Frequently Asked Questions – PPS, NEWYORK-PRESBYTERIAN HOSP., 
http://www.nyp.org/pps/faq [https://perma.cc/CL4Q-BJZ5].  The members of a PPS 
are intended to integrate their health care delivery operations, their budget, their 
resources, and their management to foster efficiencies. Id.  These efficiencies are 
geared towards generating savings specifically for New York’s Medicaid program. Id.  
 10. See Robin E. Remis, Healthcare and the Federal Antitrust Laws: The 
Likelihood of a Harmonious Coexistence, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 113, 
116 (1996). 
 11. See id. 
 12. See generally N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 83-1.1 (2018). 
 13. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351–52 (1943) (establishing the state action 
doctrine for antitrust immunity); see also City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., 
Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 370 (1991) (“Relying on principles of federalism and state 
sovereignty, we held that the Sherman Act did not apply to anticompetitive restraints 
imposed by the States ‘as an act of government.’”). 
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affirmatively expressed state policy to displace competition,”14 and 
(2) the conduct is actively supervised by the state.15 
Although the New York COPA statute purports to provide broad 
antitrust immunity, it only vaguely forecasts the specific 
anticompetitive conduct and effects that the State will tolerate.  As 
such, the COPA statute’s substance most likely falls short of 
providing a clearly articulated policy as would be required for the 
state action doctrine to apply. 
Further, it is unclear whether the regime satisfies the requirement 
of active state supervision.  The COPA framework requires the New 
York Department of Health to monitor the providers’ conduct and 
empowers the New York Attorney General to withdraw immunity 
and challenge conduct it deems outside the State’s intended scope of 
collaboration.  However, those remedies may be insufficiently 
meaningful.  First, the State’s broad terms of review do not provide 
clear guidance to participating collaborations, increasing the risk they 
engage in anticompetitive, prohibited conduct.  Second, state agencies 
lack the intermediate power to control and correct the conduct, short 
of initiating antitrust enforcement litigation under federal and state 
law.  Given that an antitrust challenge could threaten the legal 
viability of the entire PPS program and the State’s overarching aim of 
promoting greater collaboration among health care providers, there 
are substantial disincentives for the State to bring an antitrust 
challenge against its own program.  The State, therefore, may be 
inclined to tolerate substantial abuse of the COPA immunity, such as 
practices that arguably raise prices in the intermediate timeframe, 
before targeting the abuse.  Without a meaningful tool to provide 
active supervision, and a clearly articulated policy, the state action 
doctrine is unlikely to provide immunity to the PPS regime.  Without 
that immunity, the PPSs are cartels vulnerable to legal challenge. 
However, there are several strategies New York might adopt to 
increase its success in invoking state action immunity to protect 
health care reform.  For example, the legislature might amend the 
COPA statute to provide clearer guidance on permitted practices.  As 
it stands, the statute covers an overly broad range of possible 
anticompetitive conduct and creates blanket immunity.16  However, 
the State can improve its likelihood of satisfying the state action 
doctrine’s “clear articulation” requirement if the State specifies the 
                                                                                                                 
 14. FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 226 (2013). 
 15. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. 621, 633 (1992). 
 16. See infra Section III.B. 
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scope of permissible conduct and clarifies the circumstances in which 
immunity should apply.17  Additionally, the New York Attorney 
General can refine the standards it will apply in reviewing COPA 
applications and PPS performance and strengthen its power to 
intervene with tailored, remedial action.  With a clearer set of 
guidelines and the power to control anticompetitive conduct short of 
wholesale withdrawal of antitrust immunity, New York’s COPA 
program stands a stronger chance of also satisfying the state action 
doctrine’s “active supervision” requirement.18 
This Note examines the question of whether New York’s attempt 
to provide certain health care collaborations with immunity from 
federal antitrust laws comports with recent Supreme Court decisions 
clarifying the state action doctrine.19  Part I describes New York’s 
DSRIP Program and the accompanying COPA immunity framework.  
Part II examines the foundations of the ongoing policy debate over 
the role of antitrust law in health care reform and the principles of the 
state action doctrine as they apply in that context.  Part III analyzes 
the viability of New York’s COPA immunity under the state action 
doctrine.  Part IV proposes a number of changes New York might 
consider to secure its immunity initiatives. 
I.  NEW YORK’S DSRIP PROGRAM AND COPA ANTITRUST 
IMMUNITY 
On April 14, 2014, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo announced that 
New York had entered into a Medicaid Section 1115 Waiver 
Amendment agreement20 with the U.S. Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services.21  This agreement enables New York to reinvest 
eight billion dollars in federal savings produced by Medicaid 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
 19. See generally N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015); 
Phoebe Putney, 568 U.S. 216. 
 20. See Social Security Act § 1115, 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2012).  An Expansion waiver 
granted under section 1115 permits individual states to implement the Affordable 
Care Act’s Medicaid expansion in ways beyond the scope provided by federal law. 
See MaryBeth Musumeci & Rubin Rudowitz, The ACA and Medicaid Expansion 
Waivers: Executive Summary, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Nov. 20, 2015), http://kff.org/
medicaid/issue-brief/the-aca-and-medicaid-expansion-waivers/ [https://perma.cc/B4
DC-RGQU]. 
 21. Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Announces 
Final Approval of $8 Billion MRT Waiver to Protect and Transform New York’s 
Health Care System (Apr. 14, 2014), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-
cuomo-announces-final-approval-8-billion-mrt-waiver-protect-and-transform-new-
yorks [https://perma.cc/85TW-Q36C]. 
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Redesign Team (“MRT”)22 reforms.  Under the MRT Agreement, 
reforms will be implemented through the DSRIP Program, which 
allows health care providers in a given area who meet certain criteria 
to form collaborative units known as Performing Provider Systems or 
PPSs.23  Such collaborations are designed to improve care quality and 
lower costs through improvement and innovation.24  For example, the 
participating health care providers in a qualifying DSRIP PPS would 
share resources and information on the provision of medical services 
with the aim of providing more efficient, less redundant care in a 
given community.25  According to Governor Cuomo, increasing 
collaboration among providers will simultaneously improve care 
quality while reducing avoidable hospital utilization by up to twenty-
five percent over a five-year period.26  The goal of such collaboration 
is to reduce the costs ultimately attributable to Medicaid.27 
Increased federal funding distributed by the DSRIP Program 
serves as the incentive for providers to aggressively pursue 
collaborative efficiency.28  To apply for PPS status, providers must 
come together, form plans for their collaboration, and apply as a 
group.  Each prospective PPS must serve a population of at least five 
thousand Medicaid members.  Medicaid compensation for care 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Id.  Governor Cuomo created the Medicaid Redesign Team “to address 
underlying health care cost and quality issues in New York’s Medicaid program,” and 
develop a long-term plan for health care reform. See Redesigning the Medicaid 
Program: DSRIP and MRT Waiver Amendment Information – About the Medicaid 
Redesign Team, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, https://www.health.ny.gov/
health_care/medicaid/redesign/ [https://perma.cc/V335-9DBD]. 
 23. Section 1115 of the Social Security Act empowers states to experiment with 
adjustments to their Medicaid programs. See Samantha Artiga, Kaiser Comm’n on 
Medicaid & the Uninsured, Five Key Questions and Answers About Section 1115 
Demonstration Waivers, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (June 2011), https://kaiserfamily
foundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8196.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6C8-3DKJ]; see 
also 42 U.S.C. § 1315. 
 24. New York State’s $8 Billion Medicaid 1115 Waiver Amendment to Improve 
Access, Quality and Efficiency in the State’s Health Care Delivery System, ROPES & 




 25. See DSRIP Overview, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, 
https://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/redesign/dsrip/overview.htm 
[https://perma.cc/69L6-SGAB]. 
 26. See Ropes & Gray Alert, supra note 24. 
 27. See DSRIP Overview, supra note 25. 
 28. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, MRT WAIVER AMENDMENT/DSRIP SPECIAL 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS 55–56 (2012), http://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/
medicaid/redesign/dsrip/docs/2015-10-01_special_terms_and_conditions.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6XCJ-EEL7]. 
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delivery will depend on meeting certain efficiency benchmarks set 
and monitored by the State.29  Typically, Medicaid reimburses 
providers for services at rates determined by the State.30  The MRT 
Agreement terms make the level of funding provided by the federal 
government contingent on New York meeting overall performance 
goals, and may be reduced if savings and performance benchmarks 
are not met.31 
Health care providers may be deterred from creating PPSs because 
they fear such collaboration with competitors could expose them to 
antitrust enforcement.  To combat this fear and encourage DSRIP 
collaboration, New York offers prospective collaborators the 
opportunity to apply for state action immunity under New York 
Public Health Law article 92-F (“the COPA statute”).32  Pursuant to 
the COPA statute, the New York Department of Health promulgated 
regulations to govern the COPA application process, as well as 
monitor the PPSs’ performance and competitive effects.33  This 
performance review determines the levels of additional funding a PPS 
will receive from the State, and also serves to monitor and reevaluate 
a PPS’s COPA status.  To apply for COPA immunity, the PPS must 
submit a copy of the relevant collaboration agreements and a 
description of their nature and scope, along with their contractual 
terms and other performance data.34  The PPS must also provide 
documentation pertaining to the PPS’s financial position and the 
present market conditions for regular review.35  The New York 
Department of Health, along with the New York Attorney General’s 
office review the COPA application according to these terms to 
decide whether the State’s policy to encourage innovation is best 
served by granting immunity.36 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See DSRIP Overview, supra note 25, at 42. 
 30. See Uwe Reinhardt, How do Hospitals Get Paid? A Primer, N.Y. TIMES: 
ECONOMIX (Jan. 23, 2009), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/how-do-
hospitals-get-paid-a-primer/ [https://perma.cc/GBM6-BWGH]. 
 31. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 28, at 54–55. 
 32. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2999-aa (McKinney 2017). 
 33. Evans, supra note 9. 
 34. See id. 
 35. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 83-1.10 (2018). 
 36. Id. 
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II.  THE CONFLICT BETWEEN HEALTH CARE REFORM AND 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: THE ROLE OF THE STATE ACTION 
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE 
Federal and state efforts to reform the health care landscape reflect 
an evolving policy debate about whether the law should treat health 
care as a social system or a market entity.37  As costs continued to rise 
through the 1990s, policy makers focused on how health care was 
delivered and paid for, which prompted a shift towards the view that 
systematic collaboration should be emphasized over pure 
competition.38  Consequently, antitrust laws have been a source of 
tension in health care reform because they are based on the principle 
that competition among providers ultimately benefits patients.39  This 
section examines the policy debate about how the American health 
care system should function in the antitrust context and discusses the 
role of New York’s state action immunity statute in this debate.  
Although they approach the issue from potentially conflicting 
perspectives, both antitrust laws and pro-collaboration reforms are 
aimed at exactly the same goal: lowering the cost and improving the 
quality of care given to patients.  The state action doctrine comes into 
play when the two approaches collide.  Section II.A provides 
background on some recent changes in the American health care 
system and discusses the associated policy positions.  Section II.B 
describes both the enforcement of the antitrust laws in health care 
and the role of state action immunity in health care reform efforts. 
A. Efficiency and Quality Through Collaboration: The Basis for 
Health Care Reform 
In the current debate about the nature of health care, one side 
approaches the provision of medical services as a market that should 
be subject to the forces of competition, while the other treats it as a 
social system that functions best in a less competitive environment.40  
Supporters of the market paradigm argue that maintaining 
competition forces health care providers to continually seek 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See James F. Blumenstein, Antitrust Enforcement in the Health Care 
Industry: A Battleground of Competing Paradigms, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 421, 421–22 
(2008). 
 38. See Howard, supra note 7, at 88. 
 39. See id. at 71. 
 40. See, e.g., James F. Blumenstein, Health Care Reform and Competing Visions 
of Medical Care: Antitrust and State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1459, 1459 (1994). 
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efficiencies that permit them to offer better services at lower prices.41  
Supporters of the social system paradigm argue that health care 
differs from other markets in the sense that patients—the key 
consumers—are not cost conscious actors.42  Patients, who often lack 
knowledge about medical science, technology, and the potential 
outcomes of different treatments, are not sufficiently informed to 
measure the value of different treatment options.43  Further, patients 
typically do not bear the immediate costs of the services they 
receive.44  The fact that either insurance companies or government 
programs bear these costs, combined with the lack of available cost 
comparison information, leaves patients without the motivation or 
ability to question a doctor’s recommended treatments, regardless of 
the price.45  Providers will often take advantage of this dynamic, for 
instance, by charging multiple times for the same service or on an 
individually itemized basis, because higher fees result in increased 
recoupment.46 
These inefficiencies have largely defined the structures used to pay 
for health care.  For example, inefficiency was prevalent in the “fee-
for-service” and managed care payment models that pervaded 
through the 1980s and 1990s.47  Under the fee-for-service model, 
providers billed on an individual basis for each test and procedure 
provided and every resource expended, the costs of which were 
generally passed on to insurance companies.48  This motivated 
providers to extend hospitalizations and exercise less cost discretion 
in their treatment.49  The managed care system was intended to 
correct these problems by requiring that insurance companies pay for 
specific services covered by the policy, rather than individual services 
and resources.50  As a result, providers tailored their treatment to the 
patient’s insurance cost caps.51  Although managed care slowed the 
cost increases in the short term, the providers’ focus shifted to the 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See Blumenstein, supra note 37, at 423. 
 42. See id. at 427. 
 43. See Blumenstein, supra note 40, at 1475. 
 44. See Elizabeth L. Rowe, Accountable Care Organizations: How Antitrust Law 
Impacts the Evolving Landscape of Health Care, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1855, 1856 
(2012). 
 45. See id. at 1881. 
 46. See id. at 1858. 
 47. See id. at 1858–59. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. 
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amount charged rather than the treatment process, which degraded 
the quality of care provided.52 
Advocates for treating the healthcare industry as a social system 
argue that competition among providers exacerbates the problem of 
low quality care because it prevents providers from cooperating 
efficiently.53  As medical science and technology advanced and 
professional specialties improved, individual providers increasingly 
lacked the capacity to provide the full array of services that might be 
available to treat a given illness.  A single patient’s treatment might 
be in the hands of multiple providers from competing institutions who 
were not predisposed to share information and resources or to fully 
cooperate.  The resulting redundancies and inefficiencies contributed 
to escalating health care costs.54  In contrast, the ACA’s ACO 
reforms promote the creation of efficiencies through sharing 
information and pooling resources and create financial incentives for 
pursuing such efficiencies.55  The theory is that increased 
collaboration will foster seamless, integrated care that is focused on 
the quality and efficiency of the service, while removing incentives for 
redundancy.56 
B. Antitrust Enforcement in Health Care and the Role of the State 
Action Doctrine 
Increased collaboration among providers can collide with antitrust 
laws, which are motivated by the basic assumption that vigorous 
competition in the market benefits consumers, and that health care is 
not an exception.57  Antitrust enforcement in the health care system 
originated when the Supreme Court rejected the previously 
established “learned profession exception” to the antitrust laws in its 
1975 decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.58  After Goldfarb, 
those practicing medicine and providing health care—previously 
considered exempt “learned professionals”—were subject to antitrust 
                                                                                                                 
 52. See id. 
 53. See Blumenstein, supra note 40, at 1483. 
 54. See Rowe, supra note 44, at 1858. 
 55. ANN MARIE MARCIARILLE ET AL., BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS TO CREATING 
SAFETY-NET ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL STATUTORY AND 
REGULATORY ISSUES 2 (2011), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/chefs/FINAL_
assembled_SafetyNetACO.0817-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YS3-745V]. 
 56. Ropes & Gray Alert, supra note 24. 
 57. Letter from FTC, to N.Y. Dep’t of Health, Regarding Certificate of Public 
Advantage Applications Filed Pursuant to New York Public Health Law, 
10 NYCRR, Subpart 83-1, at 3 (Apr. 22, 2015) [hereinafter FTC Letter]. 
 58. See 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975). 
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regulation.59  Since then, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and 
the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (together “the 
Agencies”) have actively policed the health care system, challenging 
mergers and collaborative efforts that they deem anticompetitive.60  
The Agencies maintain that mergers, acquisitions, total integration, 
and comprehensive collaboration arrangements can reduce the 
number of competitors in a given market and increase the 
collaboration’s market power.  This in turn can create monopolies or 
oligopolies, and lead to supra-competitive pricing,61 exclusive dealing, 
barriers to the entry of new health care providers, and other practices 
that antitrust laws prohibit.62  The threat of enforcement under the 
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, which together regulate 
anticompetitive agreements among competitors, monopolization of 
markets, and mergers, can chill health care providers’ attempts to 
collaborate, especially where collaboration might be interpreted as 
potentially consolidating the market or increasing market power.63 
Given that New York’s DSRIP Program aims to extend the desired 
benefits of collaboration as aggressively as possible, and that antitrust 
laws might impede those efforts in geographic markets with already 
limited competition, it follows that New York would seek to provide 
collaborators with state action immunity.  Protection from the threat 
of costly and often damaging antitrust litigation frees providers to 
vigorously pursue New York’s desired collaborative efficiencies. 
The state action doctrine originated in Parker v. Brown,64 in which 
the Supreme Court first recognized that states acting in their 
sovereign capacity were immune from the antitrust laws.65  The Court 
held that neither the Sherman Act’s text nor history suggested that it 
                                                                                                                 
 59. See id. 
 60. See Evans, supra note 9. 
 61. See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related 
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 702–03 (1975).  
Supra-competitive prices are prices that are higher than they would be if they were 
subject to competition. Id.  Antitrust doctrine rests on the premise that competition 
will force rival firms to continually improve their products and sell them at prices that 
are at or near the cost of production. Id.  This will be the case because firms that 
charge prices that are significantly above their costs will lose business to competitors 
who charge lower prices for comparable products. Id.  When competition is 
constrained or eliminated, firms have the power to charge prices well above the cost 
of the product. Id.  
 62. See Rowe, supra note 44, at 1861. 
 63. See generally Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012); Clayton 
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012); see also Rowe, supra note 44, at 1861. 
 64. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
 65. See id. at 350–53.  
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was intended to limit the states’ authority to regulate markets within 
their own borders.66  Although antitrust laws represent the national 
policy that competition is essential to the “preservation of the free 
market and a system of free enterprise,”67 the principles of federalism 
dictate that states retain the right to regulate their own economies in 
ways that are inconsistent with the value of competition.68  However, 
because of the value of competition to free markets, grants of “state-
action immunity [are] disfavored, much as are repeals by 
implication.”69  The state action doctrine has continually evolved, and 
now provides an affirmative defense for actions taken by private 
parties so long as two requirements are met.70  “First, the challenged 
restraint must be one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed 
as state policy; second, the policy must be actively supervised by the 
State itself.”71 
The FTC has, unsurprisingly, voiced concerns about New York’s 
COPA framework.72  These concerns are twofold.  First, the FTC 
believes that such a broadly cast immunity is not necessary for DSRIP 
PPSs to achieve the desired efficiencies, because the collaboration the 
program incentivizes is procompetitive, and will not tend to lessen 
competition in the health care market.73  Second, and more 
importantly, the FTC fears that this broad grant of immunity will 
protect collaboration beyond the scope of DSRIP, and empower 
otherwise competing actors to lessen competition that would 
otherwise benefit consumers.74  The FTC argues that immunity is 
unwarranted because the DSRIP Program aims to streamline health 
care delivery, generate efficiencies, cut costs, and improve quality, all 
of which are typically considered procompetitive functions, and are 
not necessarily antitrust violations.75  According to the FTC’s 
understanding, the State does not have to grant immunity to certain 
health care providers, because the health care reform objectives can 
be met without shielding overtly anticompetitive conduct from 
                                                                                                                 
 66. See id. at 350–51. 
 67. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 632 (1992). 
 68. See id.; see also FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 223–27 
(2013). 
 69. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 636. 
 70. See id. at 633. 
 71. Id. (citing Cal. Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 
(1980)). 
 72. See FTC Letter, supra note 57, at 1. 
 73. See id. at 1–3. 
 74. See id. at 3–5. 
 75. See id. at 2–4. 
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antitrust enforcement.76  The antitrust laws permit firms to 
collaborate for efficiency as long as the procompetitive value of the 
efficiencies outweighs their anticompetitive effects.77  Therefore, the 
antitrust laws would theoretically permit most of the collaborative 
conduct PPSs are inclined to pursue, regardless of immunity.  By 
implication, the only possible remaining conduct gaining 
immunization by the DSRIP scheme would be activities that are 
especially anticompetitive and pose a substantial threat to the health 
care market.78 
The FTC illustrated its point in the context of three PPSs that had 
applied for COPA protection.79  The three PPSs were all in rural or 
otherwise geographically isolated regions with limited competitors in 
the health care market.80  Under such conditions, mergers or 
cooperative agreements that entail full clinical and financial 
integration would consolidate competitors in an already small market.  
As such, the PPSs would have a hard time passing muster under the 
antitrust laws absent immunity, because they are likely to 
unacceptably restrain competition.81 
Although the Agencies favor competition as a means of protecting 
patients’ interests, they are not deaf to national policy favoring 
                                                                                                                 
 76. See id. 
 77. The Sherman Act has been interpreted to prohibit only contracts, 
combinations, or conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade. See generally PHILLIP 
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 301 (Wolters Kluwer eds., 4th ed. 
2017).  Thus, courts tasked with deciding whether a challenged restraint constitutes 
and antitrust violation apply the rule of reason. Id.  In applying the rule of reason, 
courts weigh the challenged restraint’s anticompetitive and procompetitive effects, 
and determine whether alternative courses of action could produce the desired 
procompetitive effects without restraining competition. Id.  A restraint is permissible 
if it, on balance, creates procompetitive efficiencies that cannot be generated in a less 
restrictive means, and the benefits of the procompetitive effects outweigh the 
anticompetitive effects. Id. 
 78. See FTC Letter, supra note 57, at 5. 
 79. See id. at 4. 
 80. The Federal Trade Commission’s Comment Letter to the New York 
Department of Health expressed the Bureau of Competition Office of Policy 
Planning’s views on the COPA framework generally, but also relayed specific 
concerns about three COPA applications that had been filed at that time.  These 
included the Adirondack Health Institute DSRIP PPS, the Advocate Community 
Partners DSRIP PPS, and the Staten Island DSRIP PPS. See id. at 6 nn.2–4. 
 81. See id. at 5.  For background, see generally FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG 
COMPETITORS (2000); FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT OF 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE (1996). 
888 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
collaboration and efficiency.82  The Agencies have issued a series of 
guidelines on how they approach and analyze various types of 
consolidation and integration in the health care sphere.83  These 
guidelines describe what factors the agencies assess and how they 
weigh those factors in determining whether conduct should be 
challenged.  They also establish “safety zones” that set parameters for 
collaborations that avoid anticompetitive issues.84  The guidelines, 
however, do not account for New York’s desire for these efficiencies 
to benefit Medicaid’s system and patients in areas where competition 
and collaboration cannot coexist in their fullest forms.  In such cases, 
New York would prefer to replace competition with collaboration.85 
Both New York’s Medicaid policy promoting collaboration and 
efficiency and the federal antitrust policy of protecting healthy 
competition aim to produce precisely the same end results: higher 
quality care at lower costs.  However, they are pursuing the same goal 
from opposite ends of the ideological spectrum.  The antitrust 
rationale suggests that competition among rivals in health care 
markets will force providers to do a better job at the lowest cost.86  
New York’s DSRIP rationale, which perceives that higher degrees of 
collaboration will improve overall quality and lower costs, seeks to 
replace antitrust regulation of the competitive landscape with its own 
regulation of collaborative performance.87  The state action doctrine 
provides the State with a legitimate means to do so.  Yet, as the FTC 
has pointed out,88 most of the collaborative conduct in which DSRIP 
PPSs engage will not be anticompetitive in nature.  Because the range 
of potentially concerning conduct is small, there may be regulatory 
measures the State might pursue to isolate and control specific 
anticompetitive conduct short of blanket immunity.89 
III.  THE VIABILITY OF NEW YORK’S COPA IMMUNITY EFFORTS 
UNDER THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 
New York’s attempt to shield certain PPSs with antitrust immunity 
reflects its intent to encourage the aggressive pursuit of efficiencies 
                                                                                                                 
 82. See STATEMENT OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE, 
supra note 81, at 3. 
 83. See id. at 1. 
 84. See id. at 5–6. 
 85. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2999-aa (McKinney 2017). 
 86. See Rowe, supra note 44, at 1870–71. 
 87. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2999-aa. 
 88. FTC Letter, supra note 57, at 1. 
 89. See infra Part IV. 
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for the benefit of Medicaid’s uninsured and low-income 
beneficiaries.90  However, it is unlikely that this effort comports with 
the substantive requirements that must be met for the state action 
doctrine to protect the actions of private market participants.  
Specifically, New York’s COPA statute and its accompanying 
regulations neither adequately forecast nor supervise the specific 
anticompetitive conduct and effects the State seeks to condone.  
Part III discusses the basic aims and parameters of New York’s 
COPA program, as compared to the elements of the state action 
doctrine, and argues that the State’s efforts do not clearly satisfy 
either prong of the analysis. 
A. The Implications of New York’s COPA State Action Statute 
The COPA framework is intended to facilitate improvements to 
Medicaid, but does not specifically account for the competitive effects 
experienced by private payors.  The DSRIP Program aims to benefit 
the Medicaid system, and by extension, its uninsured and low-income 
beneficiaries.91  The Medicaid system pays providers state-established 
rates for their services, and supplemental funding from the DSRIP 
Program depends on whether the PPS achieves its preset performance 
and efficiency benchmarks.92  However, the PPSs will still negotiate 
rates and fees privately with insurance companies.93 
By consolidating the market, a PPS may be able to increase its 
market power, which could set the stage for a range of 
anticompetitive behavior.94  For example, a PPS in a market with few 
competitors could behave as a cartel.95  If the collaborators negotiate 
with private payors using a single identity, or negotiate separately 
while sharing sensitive operational information, they could maximize 
their bargaining power and raise prices to supra-competitive levels.96  
Moreover, the PPS could use its market power to deter new providers 
from entering the market.97  According to the Agencies, 
                                                                                                                 
 90. See FTC Letter, supra note 57, at 1. 
 91. See Evans, supra note 9. 
 92. See Reinhardt, supra note 30; see also N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra 
note 28, at 55. 
 93. See Reinhardt, supra note 30. 
 94. See, e.g., Nicole Harrell Duke, Comment, Hospital Mergers Versus 
Consumers: An Antitrust Analysis, 30 U. BALT. L. REV. 75, 82 (2000). 
 95. See, e.g., id. at 82–83. 
 96. See Tara Adams Ragone, Structuring Medicaid Accountable Care 
Organizations to Avoid Antitrust Challenges, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1443, 1447 
(2012). 
 97. See id. 
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collaborations among even small health care providers can pose 
serious antitrust risks because these providers typically operate in 
smaller geographic markets with limited numbers of competitors.98  
Given these risks, the FTC has indicated that New York’s COPA law 
will not discourage it from following its policy of investigating and 
challenging hospital collaborations it deems anticompetitive.99  If this 
is the case, it is unclear whether New York’s purported protection 
from antitrust litigation satisfies the requirements of the state action 
doctrine. 
As discussed above, antitrust immunity attaches automatically to 
actions taken by a state legislature or high court acting in its sovereign 
capacity.100  When a private entity or a sub-state entity is acting as a 
normal market participant, however, this principle may not apply.101  
In order for either a sub-state entity, such as a municipality or state 
agency, or a private enterprise acting pursuant to state authority to 
invoke state action immunity as an antitrust defense, two conditions 
must be met.102  First, “the challenged restraint must be ‘one clearly 
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy.’”103  Second, 
the challenged conduct must have been subject to active supervision 
by the state.104  The DSRIP PPSs are formed and act pursuant to state 
statutory authority and are therefore private entities that must show 
both elements to qualify for state action immunity.  Thus, for the 
COPA statute to provide an affirmative defense in the event of a 
challenge, the PPS will have to establish both that the statutory policy 
permitting anticompetitive activity is clearly articulated, and that the 
authorized anticompetitive conduct is being actively supervised by the 
state.105 
It is not certain that New York’s COPA immunity will withstand 
judicial scrutiny under the Supreme Court’s most recent decisions.  
On its face, the COPA statute clearly evinces the State’s intent to 
provide blanket immunity from antitrust enforcement.  However, one 
might argue that the COPA framework in reality sidelines antitrust 
laws wholesale, rather than replacing antitrust laws in a specific 
                                                                                                                 
 98. See FTC Letter, supra note 57, at 1. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–52 (1943). 
 101. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealer’s Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 
105–06 (1980). 
 102. See id. at 105. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.; see also N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1113 (2015) 
(quoting Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105). 
 105. See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100–01 (1988). 
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sphere based on the economic merits of competition.  Given this 
focus, the COPA provisions reflect only that health care providers 
should be allowed to collaborate in contravention of the antitrust laws 
under certain circumstances, but is not clear as to what these 
circumstances are.  Although the accompanying COPA regulations 
provide for comprehensive and regular supervision and give state 
agencies the power to demand correction of unanticipated 
anticompetitive conduct,106 active supervision requires the State to 
actually exercise this power.107  New York’s vague police power and 
mixed political incentives raise questions about whether the 
supervisory power will actually be exercised and whether the State 
will tolerate abuses outside the immunity’s scope.108 
B. The COPA Statute and the Clear Articulation Requirement 
Since New York’s COPA statute took effect on June 29, 2011,109 
the Supreme Court has revisited the state action doctrine’s clear 
articulation requirement.  In FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Systems, 
Inc.,110 the Court reviewed a Georgia statute that granted corporate 
powers, including merger and acquisition abilities, to public hospital 
authorities.111  The question considered was whether this power 
enabled the hospital authorities to engage in mergers that would tend 
to create monopolies otherwise prohibited by section 7112 of the 
Clayton Act.113  The Court held that the state action doctrine did not 
protect the hospital merger because the general grant of corporate 
power did not clearly articulate and affirmatively express a policy to 
permit mergers that would substantially lessen competition.114  
Although a statute does not need to make the state’s desire to 
displace competition explicit, the protected conduct must be clearly 
expressed and the anticompetitive effect must be the foreseeable 
result of the authorized conduct.115 
                                                                                                                 
 106. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 83-1.1 to -1.16 (2018). 
 107. See Burget, 486 U.S. at 100–01. 
 108. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2999-aa (McKinney 2017). 
 109. Id. 
 110. 568 U.S. 216 (2013). 
 111. See id. at 219–23. 
 112. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions that tend 
“substantially to lessen competition” or “create a monopoly.” Clayton Act § 7, 
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
 113. See Phoebe Putney, 568 U.S. at 219–24.  The FTC also pursued its theory 
under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 45. 
 114. See Phoebe Putney, 568 U.S. at 227–33. 
 115. See id. at 227. 
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The COPA statute provides: “it shall be the policy of the state to 
encourage, where appropriate, cooperative, collaborative and 
integrative arrangements including but not limited to, mergers and 
acquisitions among health care providers or among others who might 
otherwise be competitors, under the active supervision of the 
commissioner.”116  Further, in the event that these arrangements, 
their planning, or their negotiation might be anticompetitive under 
the federal or state antitrust laws, “the intent of the state is to 
supplant competition with such arrangements under the active 
supervision and related administrative actions of the commissioner as 
necessary to accomplish the purposes of this article, and to provide 
state action immunity under the state and federal antitrust laws.”117  
As such, the COPA statute evinces the State’s desire to promote the 
development of certain collaborative efficiencies at the expense of 
protecting competition. 
The statute’s language reflects the New York legislature’s intent to 
create blanket immunity that protects virtually all collaborative 
conduct that would violate the antitrust laws, so long as the relevant 
state agencies approve.  Similarly, the statute explicitly states the 
legislature’s intent to “supplant” competition.  In Phoebe Putney, the 
Court stated that a legislature does not need to explicitly define the 
specific ways in which it intends to supplant antitrust laws, as long as 
anticompetitive conduct is the clear and logically foreseeable result of 
the State’s directive.118  On the one hand, the COPA statute clearly 
anticipates suppression of competition.  On the other hand, its 
references to types of conduct are vague and general.  Further, any 
contemplation of the prospective anticompetitive effects is also vague.  
Based on the Court’s reasoning, it is most likely not enough for the 
State to indicate that it wants to create blanket immunity, without 
clearly articulating a policy that contravenes competition.  The active 
policy here is to improve Medicaid, and the statute does not shed any 
light on what types of conduct the State will or will not tolerate, or 
what will be considered an abuse outside the immunity’s scope.  
Similarly, the statute does not specifically replace competition with an 
opposing policy in the areas that will be most harmed by 
anticompetitive conduct, such as private payor negotiations.119 
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 118. See Phoebe Putney, 568 U.S. at 227–33. 
 119. Compare N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2999-aa, with N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW 
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In contrast to the claim of state action immunity reviewed in 
Phoebe Putney, New York’s statute seems to insulate a wide range of 
conduct, with an equally broad range of potentially anticompetitive 
effects.120  Rather than point to specific entities deemed worthy of 
immunity by the state legislature, the COPA statute delegates the 
power to state agencies to decide on a case-by-case basis which 
specific types of conduct will be blanketed with immunity.121  
Although Phoebe Putney dealt with a specific set of powers that did 
not include the ability to take anticompetitive action, the Court’s 
holding suggests that the legislature’s articulation must be more 
specific than what New York’s COPA statute provides.122 
The lack of articulation can be seen by comparing the 2011 COPA 
statute with section 3405 of the New York Public Authorities Law 
(“Nassau Health statute”).123  Passed by the New York legislature in 
2013 after Phoebe Putney was decided, this statute grants corporate 
powers to the Nassau Health Care Corporation, a public hospital.124  
The statute authorizes the entity to “engage in arrangements, 
contracts, information sharing and other collaborative activities” that 
“may have the effect of displacing competition in the provision of 
hospital, physician, or other health care-related services.”125 
                                                                                                                 
specific hospital’s prospective corporate conduct and its likely anticompetitive effects. 
See infra note 124. 
 120. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2999-aa. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See Phoebe Putney, 568 U.S. at 227–33. 
 123. See N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 3405. 
 124. See id. 
 125. Id.  In full, the relevant statutory text provides: 
[T]he corporation is authorized to engage in arrangements, contracts, 
information sharing and other collaborative activities with public or private 
entities and individuals irrespective of the competitive consequences of 
these activities and notwithstanding that these activities may have the effect 
of displacing competition in the provision of hospital, physician, or other 
health care-related services.  These collaborative activities may include 
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hospitals and payors, whether such negotiations result in separate or 
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system network creation and operation, provided that, the corporation shall 
exercise state oversight by determining whether particular collaborations 
with public or private entities and individuals further the interests of the 
state as set forth in this subdivision and in subdivision three of section 
thirty-four hundred one of this title.  In undertaking these collaborative 
activities, the corporation and the public or private entities and individuals 
with which it collaborates shall be immunized from liability under the 
federal and state antitrust laws. 
Id. 
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Unlike the COPA statute, the Nassau Health statute most likely 
satisfies the clear articulation requirement, because it protects specific 
conduct that it recognizes may have anticompetitive effects.126  The 
legislature authorized a specific hospital system to engage in a 
number of types of collaborative agreements, but does not limit 
them.127  It also clarifies that the legislature foresees Nassau Health’s 
collaborations being anticompetitive within the meaning of the 
federal and state antitrust laws.128  Similarly, the statute lists specific 
examples of anticompetitive conduct that might result, which includes 
joint negotiations with physicians and private payors.129  The statute 
also requires that Nassau Health consider whether potential 
collaborations would further the State’s aims and file annual reports 
that focus on information pertaining to any joint negotiations with 
private payors.130  In sum, the Nassau Health statute permits a 
specific entity to take potentially anticompetitive actions, indicates 
that those actions will displace competition, forecasts a range of 
anticompetitive effects, and reveals the State’s reasons for tolerating 
these effects.  As such, this statute provides a viable model for 
meeting the clear articulation requirement after Phoebe Putney.131 
In contrast, the COPA framework seems to accept an undefined 
range of anticompetitive effects in the private market for the benefit 
of Medicaid.  While not every statute must necessarily provide the 
precise level of detail contained in the Nassau Health statute, the 
COPA statute clearly falls short of the minimum threshold.132  It 
addresses neither the intended effects on private payment 
negotiations nor potential market entrants.  Similarly, because 
reduced competition is part of the plan to improve Medicaid, rather 
than the specific goal of the program itself, the COPA statute does 
little to define the extent to which restraints of competition will be 
tolerated.133  Because it lacks the specific contemplation as to the 
form and effects of the conduct, and rather provides blanket 
immunity for various types of conduct, the COPA statute does not 
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appear to conform to the Supreme Court’s guidance in Phoebe 
Putney, and is not as likely constitute clear articulation.134 
C. The COPA Monitoring Regulations and the Active  
Supervision Requirement 
In addition to the clear articulation requirement, the state action 
doctrine will also require a PPS to establish that its behavior was 
actively supervised by the state.135  Whether New York’s regulatory 
program will satisfy this requirement is unclear.  The Supreme Court 
has recognized that when private parties engage in anticompetitive 
conduct pursuant to state policy, there is a real risk that the private 
parties will “pursue their own self-interests under the guise of 
implementing state policies.”136  To account for this risk, the state 
action doctrine will only serve as a defense for a private party that can 
prove the state monitored the challenged restraint to ensure that it 
was consistent with state policy.137 
This Section will consider the disposition of New York’s COPA 
statute and the accompanying regulations under the active 
supervision requirement.  As with the clear articulation requirement, 
New York’s COPA review and monitoring program appears to grant 
the State both comprehensive review power and the meaningful 
ability to correct any deviations from policy.  However, the State is 
also required to exercise this power.138  The State’s statutory standard 
of review entails balancing the benefits and harms of the PPSs’ 
anticompetitive conduct.139  Although the regulations provide 
examples of relevant advantages and anticompetitive 
disadvantages,140 they do not clearly address how heavily each of 
these factors will be weighed in the State’s analysis.  How these 
standards will be applied is even less clear given the State’s mixed 
incentives in reviewing PPS behavior.  Additionally, failure to 
adequately address potential antitrust concerns statutorily could 
create problems correcting anticompetitive effects if they are found to 
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outweigh the benefits after the fact.  This section will illustrate how 
these problems might play out in several hypothetical scenarios. 
The state action doctrine requires active supervision to ensure that 
the state remains politically accountable for its policy.141  This 
accountability is essential because, when a private party engages in 
anticompetitive behavior with state permission, there is a real danger 
that the party will use the immunity as cover to pursue its own private 
interests.142  In FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.,143 the Supreme 
Court opined that: 
[T]he purpose of the active supervision inquiry is not to determine 
whether the State has met some normative standard, such as 
efficiency, in its regulatory practices.  Its purpose is to determine 
whether the State has exercised sufficient independent judgment 
and control so that the details of the rates or prices have been 
established as a product of deliberate state intervention, not simply 
by agreement among private parties.144 
The Court’s description of the standard for active supervision, 
indicates that the State must exercise a high degree of control over 
the anticompetitive conduct.  Superficial or ineffective review and 
supervision is insufficient.145 
In Ticor, the Supreme Court considered whether the state action 
defense applied to title insurance companies that had been charged 
with price fixing fees for title searches.146  Arizona, Connecticut, 
Montana, and Wisconsin authorized rate bureaus to set standard 
prices charged by all of the member firms for the searches.147  The 
firms negotiated a rate and submitted it to the respective states’ 
insurance offices, and this rate automatically took effect if the state 
declined to reject it within a set period of time.148  The Court ruled 
that the state action doctrine did not apply because the states’ passive 
veto power over the rates did not amount to a specific inquiry into the 
nature of the price fixing agreement, and therefore was not an 
affirmative decision to condone it.149  The record indicated that the 
state insurance agency generally only checked the filings for 
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mathematical accuracy, and often did not review them or their 
competitive ramifications at all.150  This oversight was insufficient 
because it lacked the political accountability that the state action 
doctrine requires.151  The principles of federalism underlying the state 
action doctrine require that states maintain and “exercise power to 
review particular anticompetitive acts of private parties and disprove 
those that fail to accord with state policy.”152  Therefore, “[t]he 
question is not how well state regulation works, but whether the 
anticompetitive scheme is the State’s own.”153  Under Ticor, it is most 
likely not enough that a state policy provides for passive monitoring 
in cases where the State government lacks the incentive to remain 
active in monitoring the anticompetitive conduct. 
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly identified elements 
that will substantiate active supervision, the FTC has identified 
factors it views as indicators of sufficient monitoring.  According to 
the agency, a well-developed factual record including adequate notice 
and the opportunity for public comment, a written decision on the 
restraint’s merits, and a specific quantitative and qualitative 
assessment of the restraint’s relationship to the state legislature’s 
standards tend to reflect the fact that the state sufficiently examined 
and monitored the conduct.154  While these factors may provide a 
good view of the State’s involvement in the questioned restraint, they 
are ultimately procedural in nature and are not necessarily 
synonymous with active supervision. 
On their face, the COPA regulations and their underlying statute 
provide for the comprehensive monitoring and control of PPS 
behavior.  All COPA applications will be reviewed by the 
Department of Health, in consultation with the Attorney General and 
the Health Planning Counsel.155  The review process involves 
weighing the potential benefits of the proposed collaboration against 
the potential restraints of competition.156  Factors the State considers 
include the participants’ financial condition, the relevant market 
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dynamics, the likelihood of decreased competition, and adverse 
effects on payors’ ability to negotiate rates.157  Each COPA 
application can be made contingent on certain protective provisions 
that can theoretically lessen the anticompetitive effects of the 
collaboration.158  After the State grants COPA status, the PPS’s 
conduct is regularly reviewed according to these terms as well as its 
DSRIP performance metrics.159  If, upon review, a PPS is found to not 
comply the COPA conditions, a PPS is found to have leveraged its 
market power beyond the State’s intended scope, or a PPS’s 
anticompetitive effects outweigh its benefits, the Attorney General 
may demand that corrective measures be taken.160  If the PPS fails to 
comply, the Attorney General may withdraw the immunity and 
pursue an antitrust action.161  These regulations provide for regular 
monitoring of the PPS behavior, and provide some level of state 
control.162 
Although the COPA statute purports to supplant competition and 
provide immunity, its focus is on Medicaid, a part of the health system 
that is ancillary to the competitive landscape.  Medicaid payments are 
determined according to government policy, rather than through 
bargaining by consumers or payors.163  The COPA framework does 
not specifically address the parts of the system that competition is 
thought to protect.  However, the structure of the COPA statute 
implies that it means to permit potentially anticompetitive conduct in 
the private market, for the benefit of efficiencies in the closed 
Medicaid market.164  The State’s power to monitor and intervene in 
the conduct will not necessarily constitute active supervision because 
the standards of review on which it relies are vague.165  The 
regulations specify that increased costs and prices, diminished quality 
or availability of care, reduced competition, and the inability of health 
care payors to negotiate rates are among the results that will be 
considered disadvantages.166  However, they do not lay out clearly 
defined standards for what will and will not trigger a withdrawal of 
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immunity.167  Specifically, the procedure of evaluating whether the 
“benefits . . . no longer outweigh the disadvantages” of the 
collaboration, sheds little light on what the State’s tolerance for 
anticompetitive behavior is.168  In the context of negotiations with 
private payors, the case-by-case basis review may be inconsistent.169 
In addition to vague review standards, the regulatory program may 
lack the tools to intervene and control specific anticompetitive effects 
without fully withdrawing immunity.  Unanticipated anticompetitive 
effects might stem from elements of the collaboration that cannot be 
fixed without muting the desired efficiencies, and the State lacks the 
statutory or regulatory power to intervene and mitigate the 
problematic conduct.  For example, if a PPS’s negotiations with 
private payors result in higher prices, neither the COPA statute nor 
the regulations provide a mechanism for New York’s Department of 
Health or Attorney General’s Office to take control of the 
negotiations or enforce more appropriate rates.  The State can only 
demand changes that might not be easily complied with if the unfair 
negotiations are directly attributable to the health care providers’ 
bargaining position as a single identity under a PPS. 
If the State’s demands are not met, its chief recourse is to withdraw 
the immunity and mount an antitrust challenge.170  However, the 
State might have mixed incentives that prevent it from exercising this 
option.  On the one hand, New York’s agreement with the U.S. 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services makes the amount of 
federal funding awarded contingent on the State meeting overall cost 
reduction benchmarks.171  This gives the State an incentive to closely 
monitor and police PPS performance and conduct.  If it condones 
overly anticompetitive conduct, the PPS might be able to generate 
greater costs, raise prices, or reduce quality, all of which would harm 
the State’s overall performance.  On the other hand, New York’s 
application of the COPA law to the DSRIP Program encourages 
PPSs to pursue the State’s health care reform policy aggressively.  If 
the State weighs disadvantages heavily and makes aggressive 
demands on participants or alternatively strips the immunity and 
mounts antitrust challenges, it could devalue the COPA statute as an 
incentive to pursue efficiencies.  This could, in turn, prevent other 
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institutions from pursuing the efficiencies the State is ultimately 
seeking. 
Anticompetitive effects may be more challenging and costly to 
correct after-the fact.  Rather than controlling a specific type of 
conduct, the process of weighing advantages against anticompetitive 
disadvantages amounts to replacement of federal antitrust review 
with the State’s own review.  The danger here is that the State could 
permit prospective collaboration and integration that would 
otherwise violate the antitrust laws, and decide later that the 
immunity should not apply because the disadvantages outweigh the 
advantages.  Since the State does not have the ability to take control 
of a specific restraint, remedying the situation could possibly require 
undoing collaboration, which could be even more damaging to the 
health care system in the area than the anticompetitive conduct is.  In 
this case, the State would benefit from the ability to control the 
conduct, rather than adjust it by way of an antitrust claim. 
The essence of the active supervision requirement is to ensure that 
private entities do not use state policy as a pretext for pursuing their 
own interests.172  The danger posed by the COPA program is that a 
PPS might gain immunity and function as an anticompetitive agent, 
rather than produce the State’s desired efficiencies.  The New York 
Department of Health’s procedure of weighing the benefits of the 
conduct against the harms is vague, and provides little guidance about 
what circumstances will be found contrary to the State’s policy.  
Further, the State might not have the necessary incentives to actively 
exercise its police power because doing so could do more harm than 
good. 
The following sections illustrate these issues in the context of 
hypothetical examples.  Section III.C.1 examines possible issues that 
could arise if an immunized PPS pursues a merger in a highly 
consolidated market.  Section II.C.2 similarly discusses the antitrust 
problems that could arise when competing hospitals clinically and 
financially integrate. 
1. DSRIP-PPS Merger Scenario 
The problems with the COPA framework’s vaguely articulated 
supervision standards come to light in the merger context.  Assume 
that two hospitals exist in a narrow geographic market that serves a 
substantial number of Medicaid beneficiaries, and they are the only 
two hospitals in the area.  Independently, the two hospitals have a 
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variety of facilities, but each has capabilities that the other does not.  
Suppose further that one of the hospitals is consistently underutilized, 
while the other’s resources are constantly spread too thin.  These 
hospitals might be prime candidates to form a PPS under New York’s 
DSRIP policy. 
However, their merger would constitute a two-to-one consolidation 
that would create a monopoly in the geographic market, which is 
ordinarily problematic for antitrust purposes.  After consummation of 
the merger, the surviving entity would be the sole negotiator with 
third-party payors.173  State regulators would be faced with a tough 
decision.  A merger might produce the greatest possible efficiencies, 
and could generate substantial Medicaid savings.  Given its obvious 
anticompetitive ramifications, State policy dictates that this 
prospective PPS would need COPA protection to merge.174  If the 
collaboration is approved and COPA immunity is granted, and the 
entities are able to merge without any additional scrutiny from the 
antitrust agencies, they would begin to integrate immediately, and 
consolidate into one entity with a single corporate identity, as well as 
unified financial and medical operations. 
If the merger occurred, the newly merged PPS would regularly 
report on the progress of the integration and its attempts to generate 
efficiency.  If the merger went as planned, the integration would 
result in allocation of patients and services between facilities, sharing 
of patient information, and allocation of financial resources.  If this 
resulted in lowering costs attributable to Medicaid, it would be a 
success in the eyes of the State.  However, if the reports indicated that 
efficiencies had been generated, and costs to Medicaid had dropped, 
but the prices charged to insurers either remained the same or 
increased, the overall value of the integration would be much less 
clear.  State regulators would be forced to balance the value of the 
integration against the anticompetitive harms. 
If the merged entity does produce efficiencies, and can generally 
meet patient demand in the area, it could deter other possible 
providers from establishing hospitals in the area.  If the 
anticompetitive restraints on trade become severe enough to warrant 
the withdrawal of immunity, the next step would likely be to undo the 
merger.  To do so would be problematic for the State because it 
would cancel the efficient benefits.  Moreover, requiring 
disintegration of the merger would be complicated and would likely 
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damage the remaining entities’ ability to provide quality health care 
in the area.  The DOJ and FTC premerger notification process is, 
itself, predicated on the idea that it may be too challenging or 
damaging to the merged entities to undo a merger once it has been 
completed.175  This scenario illustrates that the State’s framework for 
monitoring and evaluating potential collaborations also entails 
weighing the costs of correcting unforeseen anticompetitive conduct, 
which might deter the State from exercising the extent of its power.  
As a result, this hypothetical would most likely not satisfy the active 
supervision requirements of state action immunity. 
2. DSRIP-PPS Clinical and Financial Integration Scenario 
Another problem with New York’s active supervision framework is 
its apparent lack of competition-specific review standards.  The 
DSRIP Program assumes that promoting collaboration will create 
efficiencies, and these efficiencies will benefit Medicaid and private 
payors alike.176  This assumption underlies the State’s ultimate goal to 
have PPSs function as completely integrated systems with a single 
identity.177  Private sector insurance plans have cited concerns that in 
certain cases, this will guarantee monopolistic or oligopolistic 
behavior.178  Analysis of a project’s competitive advantages and 
disadvantages, including the balance of bargaining power with private 
payors, is only one of the factors weighed in COPA review.  The 
regulations do not clarify how these values will be weighed, and it is 
therefore unclear whether the review program does or can amount to 
active supervision of the PPS’s effects on the competitive landscape. 
For example, take the hypothetical PPS discussed in Section II.C.1.  
Assume that, rather than merging, the two hospitals enter into a 
comprehensive cooperative agreement that encompasses care 
delivery, personnel, IT services, accounting, and other internal 
services, all of which would be integrated to function seamlessly.179  
                                                                                                                 
 175. See PREMERGER NOTIFICATION OFFICE, FTC, INTRODUCTORY GUIDE I: 
WHAT IS THE PREMERGER NOTIFICATION PROGRAM? 1 (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/attachments/premerger-introductory-guides/guide1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J69L-PRVP]. 
 176. See Ropes & Gray Alert, supra note 24. 
 177. See id. 
 178. See Letter from the N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans 
et al., to Tara Isa Koslov, Deputy Dir., FTC Office of Planning & Peter J. Mucchetti, 
Chief, Litig. Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div. (Oct. 10, 2014), http://origin-
states.politico.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files/NYS%20DSRIP%20
FTC%20DOJ%20Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/GKN2-JGPR]. 
 179. See id. 
2018] COLLABORATION IN HEALTH CARE 903 
To comply with COPA conditions intended to protect fairness in 
private payor negotiations, state regulators may require that the PPS 
incorporate internal safeguards to maintain the separate identity of 
each institution.180  In theory, this would preserve fairness in private 
negotiations. 
Maintaining meaningful separation for the sole purpose of private 
negotiations seems unrealistic where the entities reach complete 
integration.  Even if negotiations are carried out independently, it will 
be hard to separate the individual entities from the whole.  The 
pooling of operational information is one of the key aspects of New 
York’s integration policy.181  The DSRIP framework envisions that 
PPS participants share usage information so that they can allocate 
and streamline their services.182  Even if this information is not 
directly related to private price negotiations, it is inherently related to 
the competitive dynamic between the two hospitals.  Therefore, it will 
be nearly impossible for the two hospitals to retain separate identities 
for negotiation purposes. 
The COPA statute purports to eliminate private causes of action 
for antitrust violations, leaving private payors that perceive unfairness 
in the negotiating process with limited options.183  The only real 
possibility is to complain to the New York Attorney General.  The 
State is then faced with deciding how to weigh the complaint.  If the 
PPS otherwise creates efficiencies that improve quality and lower 
overall costs, the State may not be inclined to intervene, since 
intervention could risk disruption of the efficiency-driven progress. 
All of this underscores a potential failure in the State’s supervision.  
The regulations do not clearly provide protection for third-party 
payors or a competition-focused means of policing negotiations.  The 
extent to which the immunity extends to interactions outside the 
relationship with Medicaid is not clear.  Similarly, it is not clear how 
the identities of otherwise integrated providers can be meaningfully 
differentiated.  The State’s supervision does not reach individual 
negotiations with private payors, and the exercise of regulatory power 
to monitor and police them likely hinders the State’s underlying 
purpose of generating efficiencies. 
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IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Judicial precedent applying the state action doctrine emphasizes its 
roots in the principles of federalism, and clarifies that the antitrust 
laws do not interfere with a State’s rights to regulate economies and 
markets within its borders.184  However, the doctrine also requires 
that when a State chooses to supplant competition in favor of its own 
regulatory policy that permits private anticompetitive conduct, the 
State must maintain full legal accountability for the behavior it 
condones.185  New York’s DSRIP Program and COPA immunity 
framework reflect its intent to foster collaboration in the health care 
system at the expense of healthy competition.186  Nevertheless, it is 
not clear that the State retains the level of accountability that the 
state action doctrine requires.  There are several approaches the State 
might take to resolve these potential problems.  First, efforts to make 
both the statute and the applicable regulations more specific in terms 
of the forms of anticompetitive conduct and effects the legislature 
intends for PPSs to engage in will improve COPA’s position under 
the clear articulation requirement.  Second, amending the statute and 
regulations to clarify the State’s review standards and intervention 
powers will make it more likely that the grant of immunity will 
withstand scrutiny in light of the active supervision requirement. 
As previously discussed, one of the principal problems with New 
York’s COPA regime is that, if upheld, it effectively sidelines federal 
antitrust review.  Without federal regulation, the State is left to its 
own devices to decide where and when it wants to supplant 
competition.  While state action jurisprudence permits states to do so, 
New York’s policy is broadly cast in its terms, reflecting the state 
legislature’s intent to grant blanket immunity for a variety of 
anticompetitive behavior in discrete circumstances.  Similarly, the 
State has a nondescript monitoring policy and limited power and 
incentive to intervene if the immunized behavior strays from the 
intended scope.187  Because of these possible shortcomings, it is not 
clear that the COPA program constitutes either clear articulation or 
active supervision. 
There are a number of steps the New York legislature and the 
relevant state agencies can take to reinforce their immunity grants 
under the Supreme Court’s guidance on the state action doctrine.  
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The New York legislature should amend the COPA statute to more 
clearly articulate and affirmatively express the State’s policy to 
displace competition and provide clearer guidance on the State’s role 
as an active supervisor.  Revisions may also be made to the COPA 
regulations to clarify the State’s supervision standards and provide 
more corrective power short of withdrawal of immunity.  Further, 
State lawmakers should consult the agencies regarding planned 
revisions.  This Part describes these possibilities in more detail. 
As discussed above, New York’s COPA statute casts its desired 
immunity broadly in an attempt to immunize a wide range of conduct 
with an equally wide range of possibly anticompetitive effects.  It is 
unlikely that this attempt to provide blanket immunity will constitute 
clear articulation under the Supreme Court’s decision in Phoebe 
Putney.188  In contrast, New York’s subsequently passed Nassau 
Health immunity statute is far more specific in its terms.  Given the 
scope of the DSRIP Program, which is meant to reach every general 
health care provider that accepts Medicaid patients, it is not feasible 
for the New York legislature to pass an individual statute for every 
institution it seeks to protect.  However, the New York legislature 
could amend the current statute to make certain terms more specific.  
For example, the legislature could identify the specific ways that 
displacement of competition could permissibly affect the health care 
system.  This could include clear indication that the legislature intends 
for COPA protected entities to negotiate as a single unit with private 
payors, and provide for a price control mechanism to prevent abuse 
of increased bargaining power.  If the legislature can amend the 
statute to be more specific in the terms of the immunized conduct and 
its potential effects, it will be clearer whether the immunity applies in 
a given set of circumstances.  Similarly, the fact that the COPA 
statute pertains to a broad range of PPS collaborations might be 
offset by incorporating more decisive statutory directives to the New 
York Department of Health and the State Attorney General about 
which collaborations should be immune.  These types of changes 
would provide a clearer articulation of New York’s intent to supplant 
competition. 
The clear articulation requirement is closely related to the active 
supervision requirement.  “Both are directed at ensuring that 
particular anticompetitive mechanisms operate because of a 
deliberate and intended state policy.”189  Because of this close 
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relationship, the state legislature should also amend the COPA 
statute to strengthen the State’s position under the state action 
doctrine’s active supervision prong.  The active supervision 
requirement relies just as much on the monitoring procedures in place 
as it does on the State’s actual application of those procedures.190  
The State will need to diligently exercise whatever regulatory system 
is in place.  However, including guiding thresholds for what the 
permissible anticompetitive boundaries are could improve the New 
York Department of Health’s ability to weigh the advantages and 
disadvantages of a given PPS collaboration. 
Moreover, the Department of Health could also amend the 
accompanying COPA regulations to clearly delineate how different 
factors are weighed upon review.  At the moment, the 
anticompetitive permissions granted by the State are pointed at 
Medicaid, a separate part of New York’s health care system.191  The 
Department of Health should clarify how the interests of the private 
market weigh in terms of the State’s tolerance for reduced 
competition.  This will help inform market participants about exactly 
what the State’s policy is—and when a collaboration has strayed 
from it. 
Along the same lines, the Department of Health could amend the 
regulations regarding the setting of custom terms for each COPA 
awarded.  It follows that these custom terms would be tailored to 
quell the anticompetitive effects of each given situation.  If the agency 
were to, in addition, provide generally applicable rules, it would 
reflect a higher degree of state control over the conduct.  For 
example, some of the PPS specific terms might apply to how price 
negotiations are carried out with private payors.  Application of 
general rules would set clearer limits on the range of permissible 
collaborative conduct. 
The state legislature and Department of Health should also amend 
the statute and regulations to provide the State with more 
intermediate corrective power.  At the moment, the law only provides 
the state agencies with the ability to demand correction of certain 
conduct, and, if these demands prove ineffective, withdraw COPA 
status and pursue an antitrust challenge.192  The lack of intermediate 
power presents the State with a supervision problem.193  The 
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withdrawal of immunity and pursuit of a challenge is an aggressive 
option that risks devaluing the immunity as a means of promoting 
State reform policy.  If the State had more intermediate power to step 
in and take control of the anticompetitive conduct, and subdue the 
anticompetitive effects, it could maintain immunity as a viable option, 
while still promoting its underlying reform policy. 
The State would also be wise to consult with the FTC and the DOJ 
about any changes to the policy it is considering.  If the State can 
incorporate agency input into the potential reforms, the odds that the 
Agencies will challenge the immunity decrease, and the odds that the 
immunity serves to protect the State’s reform policy increase. 
CONCLUSION 
Health care reform has been one of the defining issues in the 
national political landscape for over two decades.  Although there is 
contentious disagreement over how we should view the health care 
system and how it should function, few disagree with the idea that the 
constantly rising costs of care need to be curbed, especially since the 
increased costs do not correspond to any particular improvement in 
the quality of care provided.  This conversation took a sharp turn 
when the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was enacted.  
Amongst its many goals, the ACA aimed to reduce health care costs 
by encouraging providers to collaborate, sharing resources, 
information, and expertise to provide higher quality care at lower 
costs.  As in any market, however, collaboration among competitors 
can conflict with the federal antitrust laws.  New York has focused on 
improving its Medicaid program in the hopes of ensuring greater 
access to improved health care to the state’s low-income citizens.  The 
application of New York’s Certificate of Public Advantage statute to 
this effort reflects the State’s desire to encourage health care 
providers to aggressively pursue efficiencies without fear of antitrust 
enforcement.  This move implicates the state action doctrine, which 
revolves around the fundamental balance between individual states’ 
rights to regulate their own markets, and the prevailing national 
policy to protect competition.  However, it is not clear whether New 
York’s attempt to invoke state action immunity comports with the 
Supreme Court’s most recent rulings on the subject, which have 
clarified and arguably raised its requirements. 
Although the Certificate of Public Advantage statute makes the 
State’s intentions to provide blanket immunity clear, the state action 
doctrine’s clear articulation prong requires a more specific 
contemplation of the manner and scope of the anticompetitive 
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conduct being condoned.  Similarly, the doctrine’s active supervision 
prong requires that the State both have and exercise the power to 
actively supervise the specific anticompetitive conduct.  Efforts to 
make both the statute and the accompanying regulatory regime more 
specific as to what types of anticompetitive conduct and effects the 
legislature is willing to condone will better support a finding of clear 
articulation.  Further, amending the statute and regulations to clarify 
the State’s review standards and increasing its intervention power will 
support the finding that the State controlled the conduct and ensured 
that the providers acted in accordance with the State’s overriding 
policy objectives. 
